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MAY PLAINTIFFS INCLUDE THE UNITED STATES' CLAIM
UNDER THE FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT
WITHOUT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION?
Major Michael F. Noone, Jr.
Soon after the inception of the Hospital
Recovery Claims Program, Government
agencies concluded that the most effective
means of asserting and collecting claims
under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 2651-3
would be through the injured party's attorney. Since approximately 95% of all person injury claims are settled prior to trial,'
the question of who could sue if the claim
could not be settled amicably remained unresolved. At the end of the first year all
agencies were advised to request the plaintiff's lawyers to include the Government's
claim as an item of special damages if suit
were filed., Within a few months questions
arose as to the injured party's right to assert
the Government's claim and the necessity for
the United States to be a party to the suit.
In response to these questions the following
information was distributed to the field:
The right of the injured party to assert the
United States claim in his own name finds
support in the general rule permitting a
subrogor or partial-assignor to sue for the

entire amount In his own name, the question
of distribution being a matter exclusively between the subrogor and subrogee or assignor
and assignee (Annot. 157 ALR 1242; 46 C.J.S.,

Insurance, Sec. 1209; 29 Am. Jur., Insurance,
Sec. 174).8

And the same bulletin contained a model alleThe author is Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters 3rd Air Force. He received a B.S. degree
from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, LL.B. and LL.M. degrees from the Georgetown
University Law Center. and si SJ.D. degree from
George Washington University. He is a member of
the California and District of Columbia Bars.
I Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay and the Dynamics of
Personal Injury Litigation, 59 Colum L. Rev. 1116,
1124.
2 Item I, AFJAG Repr. 1964/1 at 23, 13 Jan 1964.

3Item IB, AFJAG Repr. 1964/13 at 29, 7 Dec 1964.

gation to be included in the injured party's
complaint:
Where the attorney for the injured party asks

for a suggestion as to the form of allegation to
be included in the injured party's complaint, the
Department of Justice recommends (after the
allegation of the injuries) : As a result of said

injuries the plaintiff has received (and in the
future will continue to receive) medical and hospital care and treatment furnished by the United
States of America. The plaintiff, for the sole use
and benefit of the United States of America
under the provisions of 42 United States Code
2651-2653, and with its express consent, asserts
a claim for the reasonable value of said (past
and future) care and treatment.'
In the past 2%. years relatively few cases
have arisen in which the injured party's
right to assert the Government's claim has
been challenged 5 but, in those few cases, the
problem has been a serious one because
neither the injured party's attorney nor the
base staff judge advocate have been prepared
to oppose the defense motion to either strike
the Government's claim or name the United
States a necessary party to the plaintiff's
suit. Of course, in jurisdictions which do
not follow the collateral source doctrine, the
subrogor/assignor analogy outlined above
is inapplicable. Nor can this argument be
4 Ibid. Item IC; now para. 15-14d, AFM 112-1,
24 Feb 1967.

. I Bernzweig, Pub. L. 87-693: An Analysis and
Interpretationof the FederalMedical Care Recovery
Act, 64 Colum L. Rev. 1257, 1270, notes that in the
first two years of the program, injured parties'
attorneys were including the Government's claim in

their suit and that intervention was not necessary.
622 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, See. 207; United
States v. Bartholomew, 266 F. Supp. 213 (W.D.
Okla. 1967)which points out that Oklahoma requires

that the personal injury plaintiff must have incurred
or obligated expenses before he can bring suit for
them.
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used in those jurisdiction which require that
the subrogee/assignee must be a named party
in the assignor/subrogor's suit.,
While the Government's right to intervene
has been firmly established, 8 agencies prefer
not to request Department of Justice intervention for two reasons: The burden on the
U.S. Attorney's office (often located at some
distance from the court in which the plaintiff's suit is to be heard) and the fact that
the Government's claim is relatively so small
that the U.S. Attorney, who has absolute
authority over all affirmative claims of
$5,000 or less, is prone to compromise the
case while, if the plaintiff's attorney had
included the claim in his suit, the Government could reasonably have expected payment in full.
Thus, any Air Force legal office handling
Hospital Recovery Claims in the United
States should be prepared with a brief explaining why the injured party has a right
to include the United States' claim in his
suit. There are two different defense ploys
which may call the brief into play: (1) The
defense may question the right of the plaintiff's lawyer to represent the United States
since 5 U.S.C. 3106 and 28 U.S.C. 507 require
that the U.S. Attorney represent the United
States. It can be pointed out that these
statutes were intended to prevent the obligation of Government funds for attorney's
fees,9 that the plaintiff's attorney has agreed
not to charge the Government a fee and that
the Government has agreed to the plaintiff's
I Article 697 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure states that the, subrogee is the only party
who can recover subrogated expenses. Smith v.
Foucha, 172 So. 2d 378 (Ct. App. La. 1965) applied
this rule to an injured party's suit in which, with

the Government's consent, he had asserted a medical
care recovery claim. That portion of the suit was
dismissed on appeal. See also Irby v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 97 (Ct. App. La.

1965).
8 Toliver v. Shumate, 150 S.E. 2d 579 (W. Va.
1966); Phillips v. Trame, 252 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.

11. 1966).
See the discussion in Richter v. United States,
190 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd 296 F. 2d

509 (3rd Cir. 1961), cer. den., 396 U.S. 582 (1962).
JAG L. Rev., September-October 68

assertion of its claim.19 The assertion of an
insurance company's claim by a plaintiff's
lawyer is common subrogation practice: The
only difference in Medical Care Recovery Act
claims is that the injured party's attorney
has agreed not to charge the Government a
fee," since it is prohibited by statute.1 2 Or,
(2) the defense may question the plaintiff's
right to assert the Government's claim with
no mention being made of the attorney's
standing. It was to this motion that the 1964
JAG Reporter item" was addressed. The
Government argues since the statute describes its right as being one of subrogation,"4 the general rules ofsubrogation apply.
Among those rules is the principle -that when
the injured party's loss exceeds the amount
paid by the insurer, the insurer is not a
necessary or proper party to the suit. In
this regard the annotations at 96 ALR 871
and 159 ALR 1245 supply cases in point foi
nearly every jurisdiction in the United
States. However, since both annotations are
somewhat dated and are not readily available
in most legal offices, a brief discussion of each
jurisdiction with appropriate citations should
give base legal offices an outline for its brief:
1. United States: The Supreme Court has
held that an insurer who makes a property
damage settlement is authorized to sue in
his own name as a real party in interest."
Thus, the question arises as to whether the
United States is a real party in interest and
a necessary party within the meaning of
Rules 17(a) and 19(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. Using Aetna
Casualty as authority it may be argued that
the United States is a real party in interest
but, that it is neither indispensable nor
necessary. Although one district court has
10 AFJAG Repr. 1966/11 at 7, 25 Jul 1966, authorized the preparation of letters stating that the
plaintiff's lawyer was authorized to represent the
United States.

21Normal procedure calls for a fee. United States
Auto. Assn. v. Hills, 172 Neb. 128, 109 N.W. 2d
174, 2 A.L.R. 3d 1422 (1961)
125 U.S.C. 5502.

11See note 3 supra,
14 42 U.S.C. 2651a.
I5 United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,

338 U.S. 366 (1949).

disagreed,1 6 two other districts have held
that the insured may sue in his own name for
the full amount of the loss and that the
tort-feasor may not seek joinder of the
insurer."
2. Alabama: Cases have held that the defendant may not object to an insured's suing
for the full amount of the loss. Allen v.
Zikos, 37 Ala. App. 361, 68 So. 2d 841
(1953) ; see also Carlisle v. Miller, 275 Ala.
440, 155 So. 2d 689 (1963).
3. Alaska: There are no reported cases involving this issue. Ishmael v. City Electric
of Anchorage, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 688 (D.
Alaska 1950) is not germane since it discusses the assignment of personal injury
causes of action. Although a statement of
assignment may be requested, it is not necessary and the United States' claim is one
based on subrogation by operation of law.
4. Arizona: There are no recent cases directly in point. Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co.
v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P. 2d 495
(1966), prohibits the voluntary assignment
of a portion of a personal injury claim prior
to judgment but, since Medical Care Recovery claims are not voluntarily assigned
and since Arizona apparently follows the
collateral source doctrine, there have been
no objections to the injured party's assertion of the Government's claim.
5. Arkansas: McGeorge ContractingCo. v.
Mizell, 216 Ark. 509, 222 S.W. 2d 566 (1950)
held an insurer was not a real party in
interest, that the insured could sue for the
full amount of the loss, and that the portion
which had previously been paid by the insurance company was held in trust for the
latter. The rule was adhered to in Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hammett,
237 Ark. 954, 377 S.W. 2d 811 (1964).
& California: The general rule that an insured may sue on behalf of the insurer and
hold that portion of the recovery in trust
for the latter was followed in Mode O'Day
16 Carlson v. Consumers Power Co., 164 F. Supp.
692 (W.D. Mich. 1957).
17Braniff Airways v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D.
141 (D. Minn. 1957); Wright v. Schebler Co., 37

F.R.D. 319 (S.D. Iowa 1965).

Corp. v. Ringsby Truck Lines, 100 Cal. App.
748, 224 P. 2d 368 (1950). Those California
cases such as Fifield Manner v. Finston;
_
Cal. 2d , 354 P. 2d 1073, 1075
(1960), which prohibit assignment or subrogation of a personal injury case are dis-t
tinguishable because under the Medical Care"
Recovery Act the Government does have a
direct cause of action.
7. Colorado: A very early case, Crissey
& Fowler Lumber Co. v. Denver & R. G. R.
Co., 17 Colo. App. 275, 68 P. 670 (1902)
states that an insured may sue on behalf of,
the insurer and hold the money in trust for
the latter. The defendant has no grounds
to object to such an arrangement.
8. Connecticut: Both Smith v. Waterbury
& MiUdale Tramway Co., 99 Conn. 446, 121
Atl. 873 (1923) and Conn. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Zering, 2 Conn. Circ. Repts. 333, 199
A. 2d 18 (1963), stand for the proposition
that the insured may sue for the full amount
of the claim even though the insurer may
have paid part of the lori and the Smith
case also holds that the assignor remains
the real party in interest.
9. Delaware: Catalfano v. Higgins,
Del
, 188 A. 2d 357 (1962), ruled that
an insurer's subrogation suit, even though
payment in full had been made, must be
under the name of the insured. This provision was noted by the local federal court in
Hugley v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 32
F.R.D. 340 (D. Dela. 1963) and in an opinion
on the same case at 220 F. Supp. 147 (D.
Dela. 1963).
10. District of Columbia: Boston Ins. Co.
v. Eggleston, 185 A. 2d 914 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1962) and Lanes v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
136 A. 2d 586 (D.C. Mun. App. 1957) have
both interpreted the federal cases discussed
supra to mean that while the insurer may
be a necessary party to the insured's suit,
he is not an indispensable one.
11. Florida: Both Titus v. Emmco Ins. Co.,
Fla.
.,109 So. 2d 781 (1959) and
Scott v. Rosenthal, Fla.
-, 118 So.
2d 555 (1960) stand for the proposition that
an insured may sue on behalf of the insurer.
The Titus case states that the insured holds
that portion of the judgment which relates
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-to the insurer's payment in trust for the
latter. See also Florida Public Utilities Co.
v. Wester, 150 Fla. 378, 7 So. 2d 788 (1942).
12. Georgia: Crawford v. Hall, 56 Ga. App.
122, 192 S.E. 231 (1937), held that an insured could sue for the full amount of the
loss, holding the insurer's portion in trust
for him. Thomas v. Cities Transit, Inc., 98
Ga. App. 694, 106 S.E. 2d 351 (1958), can
be distinguished since it involves a suit by
an insurer after the insured had released
his own claim.
13. Hawaii: No reported cases discovered.
14. Idaho: Wilde v. Hansen, 70 Ida. 8, 211
P. 2d 153 (1949), held that an insured was
the real party in interest in suing for property damage even though an insurer may
have paid for the loss. See also Mitchell v.
Dyer, 81 Ida. 344, 341 P. 2d 891 (1959).
15. Illinois: Standard Industriesv. Thompson, 19 Ill. App. 2d 319, 152 N.E. 2d 500
(1958), allows an insurer to sue on behalf
of the insured, and apparently the reverse
is true as well.
16. Indiana: Powers v. Ellis, 231 Ind. 273,
108 N.E. 2d 132 (1952) and Risner v. Gibbons,_
Ind. App. -, 197 N.E. 2d 184
(1964), stand for the proposition that where
the insurer has paid only a part of the loss,
the insured may sue for the full amount
and is the real party in interest.
17. Iowa: Clancy v. Ragsdale, 251 Ia. 793,
102 N.W. 2d 890 (1960) and Rursch v. Gee,
237 Ia. 1323, 25 N.W. 2d 312 (1946), are
among those cases holding the insured to be
the real party in interest and authorizing suit
in his name only. See also Van Wie v. United
States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa 1948).
18. Kansas: Two recent cases, Ellsasser
v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 195 Kan. 117,
403 P. 2d 185 (1965) and Deemer v. Reich'ert, 195 Kan. 232, 404 P. 2d 174 (1965),
have reaffirmed the right of the insured to
sue on behalf of the insurer and hold the
insurer's portion of the judgment in trust
for him. Both cases also hold that the defendant may not move to join the insurer as
a necessary party.
19. Kentucky: In Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
Mack Mfg. Corp., 269 S.W. 2d 707 (Ky. App.
JAG L. Rev., September-October 68

1954), the court held that an insurer who
made partial payment of the loss sued for
was subject to joinder as a necessary party.
However, Works v. Winkle, 314 Ky. 91, 234
S.W. 2d 312 (1950), held that the insured
could sue for the full amount.
20. Louisiana: As pointed out in the introduction, it was held in Smdth v. Foucha, 172
So. 2d 318 (La. App. 1965), writ refused,
173 So. 2d 542, 247 La. 678 (1965), that the
United States, as subrogee, is the only party
who can recover medical expenses. It should
be noted, however, that the court stated that
the injured party showed no authority to collect these expenses. And a subsequent decision by the same court, Irby v. Government
Employees Insurance Co., 175 So. 2d 9 (La.
App. 1965), considered an arrangement in
which the injured party's attorney did represent the Government's interest and found
nothing objectionable. Thus, an injured party
may apparently sue for his medical expenses,
with the Government's consent. Cudd v.
Great American Insurance Co., 202 F. Supp.
237 (W. D. La. 1962) ; Ayers v. Watt, 185 So.
84 (La. App. 1938). The defendant has no
grounds to object. Wood v. Becker Welding
Co., 34 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 1948) ; Stein v.
Williams Lumber Co., 36 So. 2d 62 (La. App.
1948).
21. Maine: Leavitt v. Canadian Pac. Ry.
Co., 90 Me 153, 37 Atl. 886, 38 L.R.A. 152
(1897) and Dyer v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 99
Me. 195, 58 Atl 995 (1904) stand for the
proposition that an insurer's suit for damages (paid in whole or in part) should be in
the name of the insured, and it appears that
an insured is authorized to sue on behalf of
the insurer in his own name.
22. Maryland: No reported cases discovered.
23. Massachusetts: General Exchange Ins.
Corp. v. Driscoll, 315 Mass. 360, 56 N.E. 2d
970 (1944), involved a suit by an insurer
who had made a partial settlement with the
insured and joined in the insured's suit
against the tort-feasor. When the injured
party (plaintiff) settled with the defendant,
the insurer claimed an interest in the settlement and successfully sued the plaintiff's
attorney. Dicta in General Exchange sug-

gests that Massachusetts still follows the rule
of Stevens v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer
Corp., 223 Mass. 44, 111 N.E. 771 (1915)
that the insurer may sue in the name of the
insured, and it may be assumed that the
reverse is true as well.
24. Michigan: Apparently the insurer is
normally required to join the insured's suit,
General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp.
v. Sircey, 354 Mich. 478, 93 N.W. 2d 315
(1958), but the defense may waive any objection, Coniglio v. Wyoming Valley Fire
Ins. Co., 337 Mich. 38, 59 N.W. 2d 74 (1953).
It should be noted that both these cases
relate to suits where the insured did not
sue for the full amount of the loss, and it
may be that formal joinder is not necessary
if the insured agrees to protect the insurer's
interest in his suit for the full amount of
the claim.
25. Minnesota: Blair v. Espeland, 231
Minn. 444, 43 N.W. 2d 274 (1950), held that
where the insurer has not completely reimbursed the insured, the latter may sue for
the total loss, holding the insurer's portion
in trust if judgment is rendered in his favor.
See also, Coble v. Lacy, 257 Minn. 352, 101
N.W. 2d 594 (1960); Hayward v. State
Farm, 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W. 2d 316 (1942);
Flor v. Buck, 189 Minn. 131, 248 N.W. 743
(1938).
26. Mississippi: While there are no cases
directly in point, Home Ins. Co. v. Hartshorn, 128 Miss. 282, 91 So. 1 (1922), implies that an insured may sue on behalf of
his insurer assuming that his complaint alleges this loss as an item of damages.
27. Missouri: Subscribers Etc. v. Kansas
City Public Service Co., 230 Mo. App. 468,
91 S.W. 2d 227 (1936), held that the insured could sue for the full amount of the
loss, holding the subrogation portion of the
judgment in trust for his insurer. Cf. General Exchange Ins. Corp. v. Young, 357 Mo.
1099, 212 S.W. 2d 396 (1948), and Hoorman
v. White, - Mo. App. -, 349 S. W. 2d
379 (1961), where the insured had assigned
his entire claim to the insurer.
28. Montana: One very early case, Gaugler
v. Chicago,M. & P. S. Ry. Co., 197 Fed. 79,
83 (D. Mont. 1912), states that normal
practice has been for a partial assignee to

join with the assignor and sue in the name
of both. Routinely, however, state courts
in Montana have allowed the injured party
to include the Government's claim in his
suit.
29. Nebraska: Dixon v. Coffey, 161 Neb.
487, 73 N.W. 2d 660 (1955) held that the
partially reimbursed insured must sue for
the full amount of the loss. The insurer is
not a real party in interest. Shiman Bros.
& Co. v. Nebraska Nat. Hotel Co., 143 Neb.
404, 9 N.W. 2d 807 (1943); see also United
Services Automobile Association v. Hills, 172
Neb. 128, 109 N.W. 2d 174 (1961).
30. Nevada: While there are no cases directly in point, Valley Powder Co. v. Toiyabe
Supply Co., 80 Nev. 458, 396 P. 2d 137
(1964) seems to stand for the proposition
that an insurer is the real party in interest
only if it has paid the full extent of the loss
while Davenportv. State FarmMutual Automobile Ins. Co., 81 Nev. 361, 404 P. 2d 10,
11 (1965) implies that the injured party is
the real party in interest for a suit involving, inter alia, reimbursed medical expenses.
31. New Hampshire: Zielinski v. Cornwell,
100 N. H. 34, 118 A. 2d 734 (1955) and Richard D. Brew & Co. v. Auclair Transportation, Inc., 106 N.H. 310, 211 A. 2d 897
(1965) stand for the proposition that the
insured may sue for the full amount of the
loss, and the former case held that the insurer's interest should not be revealed to
the jury.
32. New Jersey: George M. Brewster &
Son v. Catalytic Const. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 109
A. 2d 805 (1954) stands for the proposition
that an insured may sue on behalf of the
insurer while FederalIns. Co. v. Englehorn,
139 N.J. Eq. 250, 50 A. 2d 833 (1947); 141
N.J. Eq. 349, 57 A. 2d 478 (1948) held that
the insured will hold his recovery in trust for
the insurer.
33. New Mexico: The leading case on this
topic is Seilman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391, 810
P. 2d 1045 (1957), reconsidered on other
grounds 66 N.M. 206, 345 P. 2d 416 (1959),
which ruled that an insurer who paid a partial loss was an indispensable party to the
suit on the grounds that to do otherwise
would be to allow splitting of a cause of
action. The decision was extensively criti-
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cized in Walden, The "New Rules" in New
;Mexico, 25 F.R.D. 107, 123-128. A subse,quent case, Home Fire & M. Ins. Co. v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 72. N.M. 163,
381 P. 2d 675, 678 (1963) suggested that
,the federal procedure should be followed but
the New Mexico court has continued to follow Seliman, Torres v. Gamble, 75 N.M. 741,
410 P. 2d 959 (1966). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F. 2d 890 (10th
Cir. 1960) has acquiesced with some reluctance to this interpretation as it applies to
cases arising in New Mexico.
34. New York: Cases involving the insured's right to include the insurer's claim
in his suit appear to be inconsistent but may
be divided into two groups. A series of cases
hold that when a loan receipt has been issued, the insurer remains the real party in
interest even though the full amount of the
loss has not been paid. Simpson v. Hartranft, 157 Misc. 387, 283 N.Y.S. 754 (1935) ;
accord Scarborough v. Bartholomew, 22
N.Y.S. 2d 635 (1940), aff'd without opinion,
263 App. Div. 765, 30 N.Y.S. 2d 971 (1941) ;
see also Kulheim v. Bayza, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 869
(1944); Maurice Slater Trucking Co. v.
Mas, 273 App. Div. 139, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 343
(1948), appeal denied 273 App. Div. 929,
78 N.Y.S. 2d 383 (1948). However, other
cases in which no loan receipt was involved
have held that the insured is the real party in
interest and can sue for the full amount of
the claim. See Henderson v. Park Central
Motors Service, 225 App. Div. 788, 232 N.Y.S.
511 (1929), affirmed 138 Misc. 183, 244
N.Y.S. 2d 409 (1930); Zamochnick v. New
York Cent. R. Co., 191 Misc. 368, 80 N.Y.S. 2d
65 (1948); Skinner v. Klein, 24 A.D. 2d
433, 260 N.Y.S. 2d 799 (1965). We believe
that the latter rule applies in subrogation
claims involving Government medical care.
35. North Carolina: Powell & Powell v.
Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E.
426 (1916) held that if the insurance paid
was less than the total loss, the action was
in the name of the insured who held the
insurer's portion of any judgment in trust
for him. The rule was affirmed in Burgess
v. Trevathan, 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E. 2d 231
(1952) and Phillips v. Alston, 257 N.C. 225,
JAG L. Rev., September-October 68

125 S.E. 2d 580 (1963) which held that the
insurer was not a necessary party. Cf. Shambley v. Jobe-Blackley Plumbing & Heating
Co., 264 N.C. 456, 142 S.E. 2d 18 (1965);
Parnell v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E. 2d 723 (1965); Milwaukee Ins. Co. v. McClean Trucking Co., 256
N.C. 721, 125 S.E. 2d 25 (1962) in which the
insurer had paid the full loss and was the
proper party to bring suit.
36. North Dakota: Regent Coop. Equity
Exch. v. Johnston's Fuel Liners, N.D.
122 N.W. 2d 151 (1963), affirmed N.D. -,
130 N.W. 2d 165 (1964) held that
the insured was the real party in interest
when the insurer had paid only part of the
loss and that the defendant could not join
the insurer in the suit.
37. Ohio: Shaw v. Chell, 176 Ohio St. 375,
199 N.E. 2d 869 (1964) held that a defendant may waive his right to have the insurer
join in the insured's suit for the uncompensated portion of his loss. However, this
case relates to the problem which arises when
the insurer and insured attempt to split their
causes of action. PermanentIns. Co. v. Cox,
99 Ohio App. 389, 133 N.E. 2d 627 (1955)
and Hoosier Condensed Milk Co. v. Doner,
96 Ohio App. 84, 121 N.E. 2d 100 (1951),
hold that when suit is brought for the full
amount of the loss, the insured, not the
insurer, is the real party in interest.
38. Oklahoma: Harrington v. Central
States F. Ins. Co., 169 Okla. 255, 36 P. 2d
738, 96 ALR 859 (1934), ruled that the insured could include in his suit a claim for
that portion of his loss paid by the insurer
and would hold that portion of the recovery
in trust. The decision also stated that the
insurer was not a necessary party to the
suit. These rules were recently affirmed in
Great American Ins. Co. v. Watts, Okla.
-,
393 P. 2d 236 (1964).
39. Oregon: Waters v. Bigelow, 210 Or.
317, 310 P. 2d 624 (1957) held that in a
normal subrogation situation, the insurer is
a necessary party, subject to joinder. It
distinguished between a simple subrogation
payment and that made on a loan receipt
(Furrerv. Yew Creek Logging Co., 206 Or.
382, 292 P. 2d 499 (1956)). This distinction

is still drawn. Cf. Laushway v. Slate, 238
Or. 352, 395 P. 2d 110 (1964) with Waterways Terminals Co. v. P. S. Lord Mechanical
Con., 242 Or. 1, 406 P. 2d 556 (1965). Thus,
on proper motion it appears that the United
States would be subject to joinder.
40. Pennsylvania: Frantz Tractor Co. v.
Providence Washington Ins. Co., 383 Pa. 542,
119 A. 2d 495 (1956) ruled that if the insurer would be required to pay nothing if
the plaintiff (insured) won his suit, the
insurer (subrogee) should be the real party
in interest. This decision is apparently based
on the majority rule that when the insurer
has paid the full loss, suit should be brought
in its name. The ruling is not clear since in
that case the insurer had only paid a portion
of the loss. Cf. Towmotor Co. v. FrankCross
Trucking Co., 205 Pa. Super. 448, 211 A. 2d
38 (1965) where the insurer had paid the
full amount of the loss but the insured
brought the action in its name.
41. Rhode Island: Cadillac Auto Co. v.
Fisher, 52 R.I. 123, 158 A. 717 (1932);
Royal Ins. Co. v. Kirwin, 51 R.I. 165, 152 A.
797 (1931) ; Ferraiolev. Lamson Oil Co., 49
R.I. 426, 143 A. 779 (1928) held that the
insurer is not a necessary party in the insured's suit and that suit should be brought
in the latter's name. Hospital Service Corp.
of R.I. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., R.I.
,
227 A. 2d 105 (1967), suggests that
Rhode Island now follows the federal definition of real party in interest (see discussion
of Federal Law supra).
42. South Carolina: Pringle v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 212 S.C. 303, 47 S.E. 2d
722 (1948) states the majority rule that
the insured may bring suit for the full
amount of the loss, holding the insurer's portion of his recovery in trust, and that the
defendant may not object. Accord, Calvert
FireIns. Co. v. James, 286 S.C. 431, 114 S.E.
2d 832 (1960).
43. South Dakota: Parker v. Hardy, 73
S.D. 247, 41 N.W. 2d 555 (1950) ruled that
the insured could sue for the full amount of
the loss and, on recovery, would hold the
insurer's portion of the judgment in trust
for him. Moreover, the insurer is not a
necessary party to the insured's suit.

44. Tennessee: Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cleveland, 162 Tenn. 83, 34 S.W. 2d
1059 (1931) states that an insured may
include the insurer's claim in his suit or
that the insurer may intervene. See also
National Cordova Corp. v. City of Memphis,
214 Tenn. 371, 380 S.W. 2d 793 (1964) which.
involves a suit in which the insurer had paid
the full loss claim and sued in the insured's
name.
45. Texas: Adheres to the general rule
enunciated in Frye v. Janow, 212 S.W. 2d
883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) that an insured
could bring suit on behalf of the insurer for
the full amount of the loss.
46. Utah: Johanson v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
107 Utah 114, 152 P. 2d 98 (1944) held
that an insured under a workmen's compensation policy was the proper party to sue for
the full amount of the loss and would act
as a trustee for that portion of the claim
relating to the insurer. This rule was affirmed
in Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P.
2d 777 (1946) and Raymer v. Hi-Line Transport, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 427, 394 P. 2d 383
(1964).
47. Vermont: Moultrop v. Gorham, 113 Vt.
317, 34 A. 2d 96 (1943) held that suit should
be for the full amount of the loss, in the insured's name and that the insured would act
as a trustee for the insurer's portion of any
recovery.
48. Virginia: No cases discovered.
49. West Virginia: No cases discovered.
50. Washington: An early decision,
Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 P.
960 (1926) states by implication that an
insured must sue on behalf of the insurer.
51. Wisconsin: Leonard v. Bottomley, 210
Wis. 411, 245 N.W. 849 (1932) ruled that
the insurer should be a party to the insured's -suit in order to protect the tortfeasor from paying for the same damage
twice. Of course, this problem would not
arise if the insured included the insurer's
claim in his suit. Liner v. Mittelstadt, 257
Wis. 70, 42 N.W. 2d 504 (1950) and United
States Guarantee Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 244 Wis. 317, 12 N.W. 2d 59 (1944)
can be distinguished on the grounds that in
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both cases the insurer paid the full amount
of the loss.
52. Wyoming: The majority rule that the
insured may include as an item of special
damages that portion of the loss compensated
by insurance and will hold that portion in
trust was announced in Iowa National Mwtual Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 P. 2d
569 (1958). That decision and Gardner v.
Walker, -

Wyo.

-,

373 P. 2d 598 (1962)

held that the insurer is not a real party in
interest.
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Of course, the cases listed above are not
definitive. They are merely research leads for
each jurisdiction and illustrate the various
tacks which may be taken to oppose efforts
to split the Government's claim from that
of the injured party's. If the brief is unavailing, and if the defendant's insurer refuses
to honor or denies the Government's claim
depending on the outcome of the injured
party's suit, then intervention may be the
only course.

